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This exploratory study investigates whether Electronic Reverse Auctions (ERAs) cause a ‘power shift’ from 
suppliers to buyers. It is important to develop greater understanding of this emerging issue in ERA literature in 
order that procurement professionals can benefit from ERA application. 
 
A review of the literature identifies bargaining power determinants, forming the basis of a conceptual model. The 
research explores the balance of power in sourcing processes that utilise ERAs and evaluates the degree to which 
the power balance is attributable to ERA. Two contrasting case studies, are developed these suggest that ERAs have 
the potential to increase the power of buying organisations, relative to suppliers, in the sourcing process.  
 
 




Since the first model for business to business online reverse auctions, pioneered by FreeMarkets in 1995 (Emiliani, 
2000), ERAs have developed the profile of Purchasing (Supply Management, 2002; Arminas, 2003) and additional 
e-Procurement tools (Arminas, 2003).  A report by I-Adapt (2003) followed by Beall et al (2003) focussed on ERA 
impact on buyer-supplier relationships. I-Adapt (2003) suggested “more than half [of suppliers] felt confident that 
they gave buyers no more power over them” (Parker, 2003a: 10), yet, suppliers also cited that “the buyer becomes 
too dominant” (I-Adapt, 2003: 4). Since Beall et al (2003: 54) enquire “Do E-RA’ Result in a Shift in Power from 
Suppliers to Buyers?” and Emiliani (2000: 184) asks “Are online auctions a truly new method of procurement, or do 
they simply facilitate traditional heavy-handed procurement methods?”, it is important to establish if ERAs are 
perpetuating traditional power-based bargaining by ‘electronic coercion’ (Emiliani and Stec, 2002a).  
 
This paper has three objectives: first, a synthesis of the relevant literature will allow the development of a 
conceptual model, developing understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of buyers and 
suppliers; secondly, two case studies will be used to investigate the impact of ERAs on power determinants; and to 
evaluate the degree to which power balance is attributable to ERA; third, a discussion of the implications of the 
findings will lead to recommendations for future research.. The scope of this study is limited to organisational 




ERAs are coordinating mechanisms (Janssen and Sol, 2000) that connect one buying organisation and many selling 
organisations in real-time, with online negotiation using proprietary software. Unlike other auction typologies, 
sellers place multiple bids against visible competitor offers, enabling price descent and dynamic pricing. Multi-
attribute formats are also available (Porter, A, 2000) that consider non-price variables e.g. continuous improvement 
rates (Contract Journal, 2004), for which Talluri and Ragatz (2004) have developed a useful framework. 
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These are commonly implemented using Application Service Providers (ASPs) (Smith and Rupp, 2002) or ‘market 
makers’ (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b), which fulfil ‘trust’; ‘aggregation’; ‘matching’ and ‘facilitating’ roles (Bailey 
and Bakos, 1997; cited in Janssen and Sol, 2000) and additional services e.g. Request For Proposal (RFP) 
development and market advice, excluding implementation support. Some ‘power users’ conduct ERAs in-house, 
whilst others have developed marketplaces, like Covisint (Wyld, 2002), ChemConnect (Hannon, 2003) and Exostar 
(Flynn, 2003), for the Automobile, Chemical and Aerospace and Defence industries, respectively.  
ERA application is appropriate when:-  
 
• An adequate number of qualified suppliers exist, with spare capacity (John, 2002; Mabert and Schoenherr, 
2001). 
• Supply exceeds demand (Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001). 
• The product or service is unequivocally specified (Beall et al, 2003; John, 2002; Emiliani, 2000). 
• No constraints exist e.g. long-term partnerships (Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001). 
• The Buying organisation is willing to change suppliers with acceptable switching costs (Beall et al, 2003; 
Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001). 
• Contract value/volumes are high/attractive to suppliers (John, 2002). 
• Probability that current prices exceed market prices, is high  (Beall et al, 2003) 
• Suppliers are willing to participate in the ERA (Beall et al, 2003). 
 
The Supply Positioning model counsels that ERAs should only be used for purchasing tactical goods, though ERAs 
have been used for strategic purchases (Beall et al, 2003). Tactical profit, buyer-centric markets, meet the above 
requirements. Buyers are more price focussed and likely to exercise buyer power in perfect competition markets. 
Emiliani (2000: 178) suggests that ERAs “work best when… the buyer has leverage or otherwise dominates the 
relationship”, supported by other literature (Supply Management, 2003a; Supplier Selection and Management 
Report, 2003). Therefore, even at this early stage, it could be suggested that buyer power is more of a prerequisite 
than an effect of ERAs. This will be explored later. 
 
The Supplier Preferencing model suggests that suppliers will only participate in ERAs if the account is attractive 
with high revenues. Using Supply Positioning and Supplier Preferencing theories together, indicates that ERAs will 
be unsuccessful in Tactical Profit markets, when suppliers view the contract as unattractive. Therefore Tactical 
Profit markets do not necessarily afford buyers the balance of power.  
 
IMPACT OF ERAS ON THE SOURCING PROCESS 
 
ERAs replace price negotiations. The traditional sourcing process structure is maintained (Smeltzer and Ruzicka, 
2000), illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, yet, the requirements and duration of each stage are modified.  For example, 
upstream preparation increases, e.g. detailed RFPs (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b) but negotiation time decreases from 
days/weeks to minutes. This raises some important questions. How has this time reduction affected suppliers’ 
propensity to take risks?  Stein and Wyld (2003) explain that suppliers experience a frantic ‘end game’, illustrated 
by ERA screenshots 
, encouraging “suppliers to act like desperate Las Vegas gambler” (New Civil Engineer 2002: 6). 
 
 
Figure 1. Traditional sourcing process 
 
How does the replacement of negotiations, traditionally the arena of buyer-supplier power struggles, affect the 
power game? Do suppliers still play their cards close to their chests or, by making buyers passive observers (Beall et 
al, 2003), with access to different information from suppliers (Emiliani, 2000), have ERAs improved the view of the 
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suppliers withhold information e.g. price breakdowns. Instead, suppliers gain a better understanding of their 
competitive position (Supplier Selection and Management Report, 2002; Emiliani, 2000) benefiting current and 
subsequent ERAs (Stein and Wyld, 2003). 
 
Yet, the ‘rules of the game’ are in the buyers’ favour (Emiliani and Stec, 2002a). Prior to the auction, buyers 
establish a reserve price and minimum bid increments reducing suppliers’ pricing freedom. Price secrecy policies 
create supplier information inefficiencies, forcing suppliers to rely on ‘fuzzy information’ and risk averse sellers to 
trade lower profit for greater certainty of contract award (Hallwood, 1996). Additionally, buyer literature and ERA 
pilot programmes have enabled buyers to better understand the ‘rules of the game’ and ERA processes. New 
consultancy services like ‘ForeSource’ (Parker, 2003b) and ‘e-Three’ (Arminas, 2004a), offering supplier advice 
and training, are only just redressing the balance of information. 
 
 
Adapted from: e-Auctions: Click to procure; Beall et al, (2003: 30) 
Figure 2. ERA sourcing process 
 
 
Do ERAs affect the number of players? ASPs improve awareness of qualified suppliers (John, 2002; Supply 
Management, 2003b; Institute of Management and Administration, 2002) e.g. Freemarkets use ‘domain experts’ 
(Dupin and Saccomano, 2003; Emiliani, 2000). Though “e-tools... should never be seen as a replacement for the 
market knowledge of buyers” (Boulby, 2003: 18). Real time price bidding enables consideration of “up to 50-60 
suppliers” (Emiliani, 2000: 179), though sourcing time constraints can limit the number of suppliers qualified 
(Porter, A, 2000; Tucker and Jones, 2000). Yet, buyers have a tradition of inviting incumbent, or approved suppliers 
with proven competence (Tucker and Jones, 2000), or trade secret confidentiality dependence (Kisiel, 2000). 
Moreover, an increasing number of suppliers are refusing to participate (Institute of Management and 
Administration, 2002; John, 2002; Trecha, 2003; Hunt, 2003), notoriously in the construction industry (Arminas, 
2004b). 
 
IMPACT OF ERAS ON SOURCING PROCESS OUTCOMES 
 
Stein and Wyld (2003) suggest buyers are the ERA winners, achieving high price savings.  Average savings range 
from 16% (Settoon and Wyld, 2003), 20% (LeSueur, 2001), to 20-50% (Carbone, 2003). DaimlerChrysler famously 
saved “estimated tens of millions of dollars” (Wyld, 2002: 38). Yet, most published savings do not account for 
direct and indirect losses (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b) and only 40% of lowest bidders are successful (Carbone, 2003). 
Emiliani (2000) and Trech (2003) suggest that savings depend on the buying organisations’ ‘starting point’ and 
practices. Do buyers have more power in ERAs than in traditional negotiations? IBM suggests not (Carbone, 2003) 
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However, technology alone is not enough, “the auction is a passive tool; It is how you use it that determines its 
success” (Supply Management, 2003b: 41). Research by PMMS Consultants suggests that technology, without 
purchasing excellence, will deliver 1.2% instead of a 14% saving. ERAs are not a substitute for best practice 
procurement. 
 
Terms and Conditions in resulting contracts are also buyer weighted. Emiliani and Stec (2001) found buyers lacked 
commitment to purchase volumes and financially punished suppliers for poor quality, though these were also used in 
traditional processes. As a result, many small suppliers (fewer than 200 employees) were prevented from 
participating in ERAs. It is important therefore, that buyers are aware of their long-term enlightened self-interest.  
 
IMPACT OF ERAS ON BUYER–SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
 
Previously, Knudsen (2003) suggested that e-Procurement tools resulted in arms’ length supplier relationships, 
though PMMS Consultants advise that this is the desired relationship when operating in Tactical Profit markets. 
Recent research (I-Adapt, 2003, Beall et al, 2003) however, suggests that ERAs have no detrimental influence on 
sustainable supplier-buyer relationships (Beall et al, 2003; Parker, 2002) but actually improve supplier performance 
against service levels (Beall et al, 2003) and five key variables from 8 – 22 % (I-Adapt, 2003).  
 
Trust between buyer and supplier has always been an industry ‘pain-point’ (Raisch, 2001; cited in Stein and Wyld, 
2003). Griffiths (2003) believes ERAs promote trust, by reducing doubt in price validity. However, it is hard to see 
how driving prices down as low as possible can create any trust (Bartholomew, 2001; cited in Stein and Wyld, 
2003), especially when buying organisations take a duplicitous approach (Emiliani, 2000).  
 
Again, ERA impact on supply-chain relationships depends on buyer conduct. “Online Reverse auctions are a 
powerful tool. Consistent with any other tool, the more powerful it is, the greater can be the damage if misused” 
(Griffiths, 2003: 194). Beall et al (2003) found that ERAs improve the state of ethics. Yet, compared to other e-
Procurement tools, ASP’s have made less ethical information available on ERAs (Abbiati, 2003). Only recently 
have ERA codes of conduct, like ‘e-Three Integrity’ (Supply Management, 2003c) and the ‘CIC Briefing note’ 
(Parker, 2004) been developed.  
 
No direct study of the impact of ERA on the buyer-supplier power balance has been conducted, though many have 
the ‘opinion’ that buyers possess power therein (Draper, 2004; Beall et al, 2003; Carbone, 2003).  Others suggest the 
balance of power depends on relative economic conditions (Beall et al, 2003; Carbone, 2003). Wyld’s e-
Procurement model (2000; cited in Stein and Wyld, 2003) suggests that e-Procurement generally shifts power to 
buyers. 
 
Key themes in the literature (illustrated on the left side in Figure 3, below) indicate that ERAs have changed the 
power game between buyers and suppliers, in the buyers’ favour, yet, the extent of this ‘power shift’ remains 
uncertain, since there is also evidence of supplier benefits. Space restrictions limit the detail of exposition in this 
paper, however a look at the determinants of power will further this debate, and some of the key elements are 
summarised on the right side of Figure 3 below. 
 
Power is predominantly defined as the ability of one entity to cause changes in the behaviour of another entity, to 
achieve the desired objective (Farrell and Schroder, 1999; Pfeffer, 1981; Shamdasani et al, 2001). Inherent in all 
definitions of power is the idea of control and influence of one party’s behaviour by another (Cartwright, 1959; cited 
by Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). If buyer power exists, the buyer must be able to change supplier behaviour, to 
achieve the buyer’s objectives.  
 
Furthermore, the actions of the seller must represent an extension from the status quo. The buying organisation must 
be “able to obtain from a supplier more favourable terms than those already available to other buyers” (OECD, 
1981; cited by Clarke et al, 2002: 27).  Moreover, the control of the buyer “should be different from the influenced 
member’s [sellers] original level of control over his own marketing strategy” (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; cited in 
Shamdasani et al, 2001: 22).  
 
Power exists in industry structure. Porter, M (1980) suggests the strength of five competitive forces, including buyer 
and supplier bargaining power, determine an industry’s economic structure, level of competition and profits. This 
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dictates the strategic choices available to, and chosen by firms operating therein. It could be argued that ERAs cause 
industries to evolve, increasing competitive rivalry between suppliers. Moreover, as stated earlier, ERA application 
is partly entrenched in industry characteristics; therefore, the buyer-supplier power balance can be a determinant, 
rather than an effect of ERA application. 
 
Porter, M (1980) further differentiates between the above intrinsic power and the propensity to exercise power: 
having power and using power (Porter, M, 1980; Clarke et al, 2002). Propensity to exercise bargaining power 
correlates positively with increased price sensitivity and is linked to organisational factors in the context of the 
external environment (Porter, M, 1980).  ERA may not be increasing buyer power but encouraging buyers to utilise 
their existing intrinsic power, creating the illusion of an intrinsic power shift.  Do ERAs develop or attract price 
sensitive buyers?  It is naïve to imply that organisations have not previously exercised bargaining power because 
technological applications did not exist.  
 
The first objective for this paper was to develop understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of 
buyers and suppliers. It is evident that key themes extracted from ERA literature and Power literature (left and right 
of Figure 3) overlap. From this synthesis, it can be argued that ERAs may influence the buyer-supplier power 
balance. It is the attempt to understand this proposed relationship further which drives the research described in the 




Variation in ERA contexts, processes, formats and buyer ethics, discussed in the literature review complicate 
generalisation of ERAs. The use of power is considered negatively, equated with ‘fear and intimidation’ (Kumar, 
1996; cited in Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003), hence respondents may be reluctant to admit its existence. 
Commercially sensitive information was also required. These considerations meant trust and credibility were critical 
to the primary research. Research methods needed to allow exploration of ERA variables and organisational context 
and gain the respondents’ trust, to accurately demonstrate the affect of ERA on buyer/supplier bargaining power. An 
interpretivist approach was appropriate given the above considerations. This enabled discovery of the “details of the 
situation to understand the reality” (Remenyi, 1998) e.g. ERA variations and respondents’ perceptions of ERA.  
 
This research adopted a case study approach (Riley et al, 2000), “an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002; cited in 
Saunders et al, 2003: 93).  This was suited to the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions proposed and enabled investigation of 
the context complexity, given its detailed, qualitative and interactive nature and high validity level (Yin, 1994).  
Each case 
study considered the buyer, supplier and ASP perspective. Only direct participants responsible for the sourcing 
process provided data. Such persons had necessary detail and competence to provide information. Sample selection 
criteria included auctioned product/service; organisational type of ownership; characteristics of Purchasing 
department  (structure, experience, size and professionalism); and ASP.  Successful suppliers were the most 
accessible given incumbent relationship with buyers, though this may create bias in the research.  
 
Case 1: This buying organisation, in the utilities sector, tendered three products, stationery, copier paper and 
computer consumables, simultaneously, using three separate ERAs in January 2003. At the time of the sourcing 
process, the centralised Purchasing department employed around 30 professional buyers - this was their second ERA 
experience. The successful supplier for stationery and copier paper was the leading independent stationer and fourth 
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Figure 3. Relationships between key themes in ERA and Power literature  
 
Case 2: The buying organisation, a Metropolitan Borough Council, tendered a contract for copier paper, using one 
ERA, for the first time, in February 2003.  This organisation was highly decentralised with only 2.5 FTEs with 
purchasing experience. The successful supplier was a local independent paper merchant, £14million annual 
turnover. The ASP had not previously conducted ERAs in UK public sector. In-depth interviews generated 
qualitative explanatory insights (Riley et al, 2000). Semi-structured interviews, consistent with the research 
considerations, enabled exploration with regard to the identified power determinants and ERA effects therein.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The findings are presented in two sections, corresponding with the research questions. The first determines the 
buyer-supplier power balance during the investigated sourcing processes. The second analyses the extent to which 
this diagnosis is the result of ERA. Both sections are divided into three subsections as outlined in Figure 3.; Intrinsic 
Power, Propensity to Exercise Power and Evidence of Power in the Sourcing Process. These results are illustrated in 
Appendix 1 Case Study Analysis. 
 
This study aimed to identify and develop understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of buyers 
and suppliers, and this was achieved through the synthesis of the academic literature in this field, resulting in the 
conceptual model illustrated in figure 3. Further, two case studies offered evidence of power determinants and some 
evaluation of the degree to which the power balance is attributable to ERA’s (appendix 1). These factors were 





POWER THEMES ERA THEMES 
Number of suppliers 
Information trades 
ASP Market information  
ERA ‘rules of the game’ 
ERA event 
THE SOURCING PROCESS 
Terms and Conditions 




  POWER IN THE SOURCING PROCESS 
Process Outcomes
Trust
Information provided by the buyer
Information provided by the seller
INTRINSIC POWER 
Importance of purchase to seller
Buyer/seller concentration 
Qualified alternatives 
Buyer ability to switch suppliers
Process costs
Threat of vertical integration
PROPENSITY TO EXERCISE POWER 
Importance of product to buyer
Product differentiation 
Buyer motivations
Buyer ability to pass on the cost of inputs
Information
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sourcing process. No evidence of significant intrinsic buyer power was found. However, supplier power was less 
obvious than that of the buyers, who were very willing to exercise any power they had, or perceived they had. This 
suggests that, in relative terms, buyers had power. Yet, evidence throughout the sourcing process indicated both 
buyer and supplier power, again suggesting that the ‘power-shift’ was not absolute. Interestingly, the highest 
intrinsic power, and propensity to exercise power in case 1 was moderated by trust in the buyer-supplier 
relationship, thus power may not necessarily be a factor in all ERA processes.  
The degree to which this power balance was attributable to ERA, was evaluated by investigating the impact of 
ERAs on bargaining power determinants. The Secondary Literature Review also established that ERAs are mainly 
applicable in buyer-centric supply markets and questioned whether the perceived power-shift was ‘reality’ or 
‘illusion’.  
 
The ‘reality’ was explored by investigating changes made by ERAs to power determinants. The effects of ERA on 
intrinsic power and propensity to exercise buyer power were found to be more extensive in case 2, than case 1, 
highlighting the importance of ‘starting points’. Buying organisations with less procurement resources and 
experience have more scope to realise ERA potential; to increase the number of suppliers willing to participate in 
the sourcing process, decrease process costs and gain additional information resources, thus increase buyer power. 
When ASPs are selected and used as consultants as opposed to ERA software providers, power factors are affected 
more, in the buyers’ favour. To implement successful ERAs buyers must also have detailed specifications and 
contract information. Therefore, to some extent, ERAs are demanding and implementing best practice procurement, 
which places the buyer in a relatively more powerful position.    
 
However, best practice also entails the development of open and honest buyer-supplier relationships, to which ERAs 
have been found to contribute. ERAs require a ‘level playing field’, increased trust and facilitate face-to-face 
discussion. Thus for organisations with high ‘starting points’, power may not be an issue. Yet, suppliers’ reaction to 
the word ‘e-auction’ indicates mistrust of ERA application, thus, power was a factor in the investigated ERA 
processes. As suppliers perceive cost motivation due to ERA use, perhaps ERAs increase buyer power irrelevant of 
‘starting points’.   
 
The ‘illusion’ was explored by researching ERA application determinants, which exceeded the number of ERA 
effects. The number of qualified alternatives, the main application factor, was one of the two main intrinsic power 
determinants that generated buyer power in most cases. Additionally, the importance of the product to the purchaser, 
product differentiation, and product specification were key reasons why products were chosen for ERA and key 
areas in which propensity to exercise power was high. ERAs are used in buyer-centric markets, by the price 
sensitive buyer. 
 
This study has found that whilst ERAs do increase buyer power slightly, depending on the buying organisations’ 
‘starting point’, the experience of the ASP and the extent to which ERA increases face-to-face discussion, ERAs do 
not cause a ‘power-shift’, since they are applied in buyer-centric supply markets only when the buyer has high 
propensity to exercise power. In the investigated copier paper and stationery markets power did not move from 
supplier to buyer because the buyer already had the balance of power. In the computer consumables market, power 
remained with the seller despite ERA application. It can therefore be argued that the perceived shift in power from 
supplier to buyer is more ‘illusion’, than ‘reality’. 
 
Exploratory case research such as that conducted here obviously raises issues that form the basis for future research, 
not least that such findings are not of themselves generalisable, and therefore need confirming. In addition such 
issues as: variation through frequent use of ERA’s; ERA use in the private sector; and the sustainability of any 
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 APPENDIX 1. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 




Throughout the sourcing process, evidence of 
both buyer and supplier power was found. 
Process outcomes indicated buyer power; yet, 
incomplete seller information suggested seller 
power. Limited information provided by 
buying organisation 2 and low trust indicated 
higher buyer power. Moreover, high levels of 
trust and cooperation in case 1 indicated that 
power may not have been a factor. 
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